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1. Purpose of Survey - To determine the bearing of volume and document handling procedures upon the work of intelligence officers and to isolate specific problems for special study.

2. Sampling - Primary emphasis was placed on interviewing intelligence officers, including geographers and similar research personnel; however, certain personnel in staff or supervisory capacities, having key relationships to the problems were also interviewed. Recommendations of senior personnel were followed in selecting persons for interview.

a. Total of 104 persons were interviewed, including 45 having positions of branch chief or higher, in 43 branches and 18 divisions of OSI and OFR. (See Tab A for further details)

3. Findings related directly to volume.

a. The intelligence officers interviewed were practically unanimous in expressing the belief that there was no appreciable volume of material received by them that had no bearing on their responsibilities for intelligence production and maintenance. However, a relatively small number of individual documents were found which were of little or no value and could be dispensed with. On the other hand, many indicated that specific documents, valuable to their work, were not being received.

b. - Only a few cases were found where there was a substantial amount of material on hand in the "in-basket" to be processed, and the primary reasons for such accumulations were the following:

(1) Inattention to incoming material because of specific "crash" assignments, requiring full-time attention; and

(2) Lack of time to dispose of backlog accumulated during leave, or vacancy of an approved slot, either professional or clerical, whose incumbent would assist in eliminating backlog.

c. Generally, branch chiefs and their deputies were in agreement with their subordinates that volume either was not a burden or was a necessary one associated with research and intelligence maintenance, to be solved by the application of additional manpower (particularly clerical and sub-professional) rather than the elimination of pertinent, though perhaps marginal, material. Some division chiefs and deputies were not as willing as their subordinates to accept the inevitability of a great volume of documents reaching the IO's, since they are responsible for all aspects of manpower and time

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utilization in the division, not only research, maintenance, and routine production, but also special crash assignments; and as a consequence some have taken steps to limit internal dissemination. (This also applies to some branches.)

d. In addition to the screening and routing done by the OCD and ORR groups, both of which were highly commended by those interviewed, there is usually at least one or more screenings before the material reaches the individual IO. This is usually done at the division level in OSI and the branch level in ORR. However, an additional echelon of screening and routing is imposed in the Geographic Area, involving considerable extra handling and transportation time, since a considerable amount of material goes from M Building to Building 11, via the Auditorium. In addition to screening material, some components do not route certain documents and accession lists, but keep them at a central location, available to all interested personnel. One branch in ORR routes no incoming documents to individual IO's but keeps them all in a reading room for a specified number of days, depending on whether they are to be routed further.

e. Although changes in reading guides are made on an ad hoc basis, two years or more may elapse between formal, documented revisions in reading requirements.

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4. Conclusions and Recommendations on volume.

a. The volume of documents received is not a general problem, per se, but varies by individual, branch, and division; and consequently, most efforts to reduce volume must be devoted to specific areas of applicability. For example, the time devoted to handling the incoming documents is usually a more important factor than the actual number of documents. (Time devoted to processing incoming documents varies from 1½ to 35 hours for individuals; and is dependent on such factors as reading rate, clerical assistance, type of project, physical working conditions, etc.)

b. Research is a process of exhaustive investigation, and review of large amounts of material for pertinency to a research project, is a concomitant of such a process; and it is the general belief of IO's that such review can best be accomplished by the person directly responsible for the project.

c. The present systems of screening and routing are effective in reducing a large proportion of the incoming material of no value to the individual, but refinements in the system might eliminate a portion of the volume received by the individual, including items of low value.

d. Material of a general or administrative nature, not bearing on the IO's work, was mentioned by some IO's as something that could be eliminated.

e. Possible methods for reducing volume (some of which are already being utilized by certain components) are as follows:

(1) Periodic, systematic, review of both individual and types of documents required, starting with the individual officer and building up requirements for branch and/or division, but with impetus originating from the reading panels, and backed by division and branch directives. This would assure keeping reading guides up to date on a periodic basis but ad hoc changes could also be made as required. Copies of these up-to-date guides should be furnished, or be readily available, to the IO's. (Numbers of individual documents, regularly received, were found to be of no value, but no initiative was taken to stop them.)

(2) More selective requirements for reading guides. To be acceptable to many officers, this method should be coupled with utilization of experienced and trained IO's on the reading panels, possibly by rotation. (An indication

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that requirements ^{for} and guides are too broad is the fact that 25% of the material received by one division is so irrelevant, it is destroyed at a central point in the division.)

(3) Centralized screening and ear-marking at division or branch level. Since ordinarily the individual IO knows his projects better than anyone else, this involves a calculated risk that some material of value may not reach him, but this must be weighed against other responsibilities of the branch or division by a line supervisor. This type of decision should be made by operating rather than staff officials.

(4) Redistribution of manpower and slots. In the isolated instances where IO's and branch chiefs considered volume a problem it was only as related to available manpower, particularly lower grade. In branches where GS-11's and 12's are spending as high as 25% of their time on clerical or GS-5 professional duties, conversion of high grade, vacant professional slots to GS-5 would appear more economical and would reduce the hours devoted to routine, intelligence maintenance. (A recent T/O proposal received by the Management Staff indicates some attention is being given to this.)

(5) More definitive and current statements of functions and policies, with dissemination to all personnel. The need for documents is directly related to the functions of branches and sections and to the extent their functions encompass both research and current intelligence support. (Isolated instances where functions were found to be ambiguous or nonconcurrent will be taken up with the appropriate office.)

(6) Review of organization and functions to assure related and interdependent functions and components are properly grouped.

(7) Use of bulletin boards for unclassified matter, instead of routing.

5. Findings related to timing.

a. Delay in receipt of documents was found to be of much more concern to IO's than volume.

b. Delays were found to be of several types:

(1) Time lag on [redacted] (e.g. April 1954 production figures in East Germany; distributed July 1954; received in branch January 1955.)

(2) Time lags due to delays in consecutive routing.

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(3) Time lags - OCD to branch. (e.g. case where State Dept. received CIA report before Office. Study by M/AG revealed that 76 percent of a sample 915 documents took 15 days or over to reach the branch from OCD coding section.)

(4) Time lags in receiving material requested from Clandestine Services.

(5) Time lags in receipt of reports from the military services.

(6) Time lags in receipt of material requested from other agencies. (IO's report purchasing books which take too long to borrow, and that material obtained personally in hours at Library of Congress takes weeks through channels.)

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6. ~~conclusions and recommendations on timing.~~

a. Although enough information was obtained to indicate that delays are a real problem, in many cases affecting intelligence production, this survey was not extensive enough to determine whether certain delays are justified and whether specific cases might be isolated exceptions.

b. Possible methods for reducing time lags are as follows:

(1) Extension of the practice of obtaining or reproducing extra copies, or specific pages and parts of copies, to reduce the number of components on multiple routing, and to expedite routing between components.

(2) Formulation of strongly-worded Office regulations relative to time limits for holding documents by individual and/or branch.

If necessary, the regulation should be followed by a requirement for noting receipt and forwarding date on documents, and follow-up to determine individuals failing to comply.

(3) Extension of the practice of identifying pertinent pages and sections of documents of interest to a particular component.

(4) Retaining for a limited time at division or branch level for reference by IO's of publications, accession lists, etc. instead of routing internally.

(5) Investigation of the feasibility of increased use of preliminary disseminations by the ~~Clandestine Services~~ of reports needed by components supporting action agencies or current intelligence.

(6) Examination of specific procedures where delays are evident but possibilities for reducing them have not been studied.

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7. Findings on other aspects of document handling.

a. Facilities for reproducing documents are considered by many persons to be grossly inadequate. This applies not only to local facilities in the Offices but also to delays in central facilities.

b. In general, comments were favorable as to OCD reference facilities, but there were indications of lack of knowledge as to best utilization of the facilities. Some IO's are unsuccessful in recovering documents, but others have no difficulty. Some comments were received to the effect that the OCD coding system is too general, and that SO-DB documents 1947-1950 are unavailable.

c. Comments were received on the need for more Russian language journals, newspapers, and economic documents. One suggestion was for the establishment of a Russian Reading Panel to expedite handling of such documents.

d. Expressions were received that more accession lists might be helpful, and that breaking down the lists by topic would save IO's time.

8. Conclusions and recommendations on other aspects of document handling.

a. Local time lags in reproduction in OCR will be studied under Project 5-51, and arrangements are being made to discuss the problem of central reproduction with IO personnel and the Assistant Management Officer, DD/A Area.

b. Education of intelligence officers in using reference facilities would undoubtedly be beneficial to all concerned. Some indication was received that as reference service was found more useful analysts would be more willing to forego some material now being routed to them.

c. With the increased number of IO's trained and now being trained in the Russian language, this factor should be considered in future planning for procurement, duplication, and processing of Russian documents.

d. The feasibility of breaking down accession lists on a topical basis should be considered, together with the possibility of routing only applicable portions.

e. The feasibility of entirely new systems of document handling, such as the machine routing of documents or substitution of accession lists for document routing are possibilities which were considered beyond the scope of the survey and were not explored.

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